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J. MORGAN KOUSSERNew Zealand social historian Fairburn’s textbook on research design
and argumentation should be widely adopted for graduate classes in
history. Drawing on the philosophy of science, Fairburn questions the
widespread practices in social history of, for instance, generalizing from
isolated instances, unsystematically assessing differences and similarities
between and within various groups, and evaluating interpretations on
mainly stylistic or ideological grounds, instead of on the basis of the
logic and power of their models. Although he persuasively criticizes the
cultural relativism of postmodernist and hermeneutic approaches as
self-refuting, he is better, and more comfortable, discussing such “soft”
stances than he is discussing economics and other “hard” social sci-
ences—which he virtually ignores, despite economists’ numerous con-
tributions to social history—or statistical methods—which he distrusts
when authors cannot completely explain them in simple terms to skep-
tical innumerates.
Fairburn’s chapters about seven “standard methodological problems”
(leaving out certain groups, fragmentary evidence, causality, differences
and similarities, socially constructed data, anachronism, and hypothesis
testing) and his examinations of ªve “modes of enquiry” (hermeneutic,
intentional, causal, “how possible?” and focused information gathering)
are grounded in acute discussions of books by such major social histo-
rians as Edward P. Thompson, Fernand Braudel, David Hackett Fischer,
Stephan Thernstrom, and Daniel Goldhagen. Graduate students will
appreciate these capsule summaries and critiques—helpful on qualifying
exams: These synopses could also stimulate discussion in classes, espe-
cially if assigned in combination with the original works themselves.
Historians pay too little attention to the logical structures of arguments
that they read and write. Fairburn’s penetrating analyses, if widely
emulated, would heighten professional self-consciousness.
The book’s best discussions, such as that on fragmentary evidence,
not only demonstrate how to assess completed historical works but also
offer rules that may help historians analyze primary evidence better.
Fairburn rejects reliance on contemporary “experts,” who may know
only parts of the truth, and appeals to “common sense,” which may be
culture-bound. Instead, he suggests attacking the problem of fragmen-
tary evidence by concentrating on cases that are inherently biased against
a particular hypothesis, comparing similar, well-documented cases,
eliminating rival hypotheses, and fully elaborating the theory and aux-
iliary hypotheses so as to suggest a wide range of evidence that would
strengthen or weaken the conclusions. His strictures are anchored in a
particularly trenchant analysis of Stone’s Crisis of the Aristocracy.1
1  Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558–1641 (Oxford, 1965).
When Fairburn turns from qualitative to quantitative history, how-
ever, he is reduced from calm adept to panicky dilettante. Counting,
beyond the computation of averages, he asserts, is now “practically
taboo” in social history, apparently because during the “mass quantiªca-
tion craze of the 1970s,” cliometricians made “unscholarly and slipshod
use of sources” and arbitrary, unexplained decisions about the appropri-
ate categories for people, failed to explain their methods, and reached
“extravagant” conclusions (148–151). In fact, plenty of sophisticated
counting still occurs in social history, though most of it takes place in
economics or sociology departments; cliometricians generally agonize
over the meaning and validity of sources, how to categorize people, and
how to specify models; useful statistical methods are often complicated;
and it is inconsistent for one who, like Fairburn, praises “bold conjec-
tures” to denounce them.
J. Morgan Kousser
California Institute of Technology
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DANIEL CHIROTElegant, learned, and persuasive, Kuper’s account of how major anthro-
pologists have treated the notion of culture in the twentieth century is
also a counsel of despair. He concludes bluntly that the study of culture
has reached such a hopeless dead end that the very concept should be
dropped.
After a good review of how early anthropologists came to deªne
culture, Kuper explains Parsons’ ambitious attempt to place it in a
speciªc analytic niche.1 For Parsons, culture consisted of values, ideas,
and other symbolic expressions of meaning, which are what he wanted
anthropologists to study, just as economists were to study production,
political scientists decision making, and sociologists integrative social
institutions. Even though Parsons was on the right track, and the core
of anthropology really should be the study of meaning—that is, of
cultures—anthropologists continued to claim a broader subject. In doing
so, they fell into the same trap as other social scientists. Each discipline
deªned its specialty as the most important, sometimes the only crucial
aspect of social life. For anthropology, therefore, culture—ideas and
meanings—came to deªne society, just as markets and prices were all
that mattered to economists and decision making became the essence
of humanity for political scientists. Parsons’ grand scholarly division of
labor never caught on, because no discipline fully recognized the legiti-
macy of the others’ concerns. Even in sociology Parsons was relegated
to footnotes after the 1960s.
1  Kuper cites numerous works by Talcott Parsons on 255–259.
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